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Standing Room Only: Solving the Injury-in-Fact
Problem for Data Breach Plaintiffs
I. INTRODUCTION
If something valuable is taken from you without your permission,
does it matter who took it? According to modern data privacy law, it
does. In fact, the answer to that simple question may end your case
before it even begins.
Consider the examples of two people who had their valuable
personal data taken from them by an unauthorized third party. 1 Person
1 enrolled in a cell phone plan with a major phone company and was
required to give the phone company some of his private information,
such as his credit card number, phone number, and home address.
Person 2 started working for a company, and was required to give her
employer her personal information, such as her name, address, Social
Security number, date of birth, and bank account number. 2 Neither
Person 1 nor Person 2 thought much about these transactions,
assuming that the companies would take reasonable steps to protect
their personal information.
Later, Person 1 discovered that his phone company had been
giving “metadata” 3 about his (and many other people’s) phone calls
to the government. 4 The phone company had been giving out this
data every day for the past five years or more. 5 The information given
to the government was not inherently sensitive—it was not Person 1’s
financial information or the contents of his calls. The government had
only collected information about the calls, such as which numbers
Person 1 had called, how often he had made those calls, and how long

1. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011); Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter ACLU].
2. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40.
3. Metadata is “data that describes and gives information about other data,”
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2015), or “[s]econdary data that organize,
manage, and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data.” BLACK ’S L AW
D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
4. See ACLU, 785 F.3d at 801.
5. See id. at 796.

5.BEATTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/19/2016 1:35 PM

2016

he had spent on each call. 6 All of this data collection occurred without
Person 1’s knowledge or permission. 7
Person 2 discovered that a hacker broke into the network where
her employer stored her personal data and gained access to the
database where Person 2’s personal information was stored. 8 Person 2
was told that the hacker may have stolen Person 2’s credit card
number, name, home address, bank account number, and even Social
Security number. 9
Concerned about the loss of their personal data, both Person 1
and Person 2 filed lawsuits. Person 1 chose to sue the government for
taking his information, 10 while Person 2 sued her company for
negligence in protecting her financial information. 11
When Person 1 and Person 2 appeared in court, they were
immediately faced with a question that may have surprised them. Both
courts began with the same threshold inquiry: did you suffer an
injury? 12 In other words, Person 1 was asked whether he was harmed
when the government collected his phone call metadata without his
permission. Likewise, Person 2 was asked whether she was harmed
when a hacker gained access to her personal financial information. The
answers to these questions had a much larger impact than either
plaintiff may have expected.
The court, upon hearing Person 1’s claim, determined that he had
suffered an injury, and could therefore bring his case before the
court. 13 However, the court hearing Person 2’s claim determined that
she had not actually suffered an injury at all, and therefore could not
bring her claim. 14 Even though Person 1’s compromised information
was only metadata, and Person 2’s compromised information included
her financial information and Social Security number, Person 1 was
able to receive redress from the courts, while Person 2 was barred.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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See id.
See id. at 795–96.
See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011).
See id.
ACLU, 785 F.3d at 787.
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 38.
See id. at 41–42; ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800.
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40–42.
See id. at 42.
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In the current legal environment, two people can have their
personal data compromised in similar ways, yet have their claims
treated in completely different manners. If the plaintiffs’ personal
information is accessed by the government, even if the information
accessed is simply metadata, they are allowed to present their case in
court. 15 But if their personal data is accessed by a private third party,
no matter how sensitive the information may be, they may not get a
chance at redress. 16
This apparent discrepancy stems from the doctrine of “standing”
contained in Article III of the United States Constitution. 17 According
to the current interpretation of the standing doctrine, many
consumers in private data breach actions have not suffered a sufficient
injury-in-fact to qualify for standing, and are therefore unqualified to
bring an action in court. 18 Because of this procedural hurdle, many
data breach plaintiffs have been forced to resort to creative theories to
qualify for standing—the most common of which is that the data
breach will increase the likelihood of a potential future injury. In other
words, plaintiffs claim that although they have not yet suffered harm,
they are certain to be harmed in the imminent future.
This theory has been met with limited success, 19 and often creates
as many problems as it purports to solve. By focusing on potential
future injuries, rather than the unauthorized access itself, courts task
themselves with predicting the future, instead of focusing on a present
controversy. Unsurprisingly, this emphasis on injury has resulted in
inconsistency and confusion in the judicial system.
The standing doctrine issue in the private data breach context has
been discussed by many scholars, who have proposed various theories
to try to make it easier for consumers to qualify under the standing
doctrine. Some have recommended that the legislature enact a
comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern data security. 20 Others
15. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800.
16. See, e.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number:
A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398–404 (2014).
18. See, e.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42.
19. See infra Section III.B.
20. See Amanda C. Border, Note, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive
Data Privacy Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363 (2012);
Tanith L. Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time?, 1 CASE W.
RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 34 (2009); Exec. Office of the President, ADMINISTRATION
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have suggested a relaxation of some of the requirements of the
standing doctrine. 21 Still others have proposed the adoption of a new,
probability-based concept of injury-in-fact. 22
This Comment suggests that such comprehensive action is not
necessarily required to address the problem of standing in private data
breach cases. Instead, this Comment suggests that courts recognize a
right to privacy for individual personal data. If courts recognize that
individuals should have a reasonable right to data security, they can
eliminate the need for courts to try to predict the future. This
recognition would allow courts to focus on present controversies,
rather than potential future harms.
The Comment goes on to explain how courts can more effectively
apply the standing doctrine in private data breach cases by adopting
the injury-in-fact standard established by the United States Supreme
Court in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA. 23 This standard has proven its
workability in the recent Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper case in
the Second Circuit. 24 These two cases show that the Supreme Court
has already created a standard in the data security area that effectively
balances plaintiffs’ right to be heard with constitutional standing
doctrine limitations. The only missing piece required to apply this
standard is recognition of a legal right to privacy for data held by a
third party. If the law were to recognize this right, either by legislation
or judicial decision, the standards in Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU
would easily establish a framework for analyzing the injury-in-fact
requirement in private data breach settings.
Part II of this Comment outlines the standing doctrine’s injuryin-fact requirement, and explains how the requirement has limited the

DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2015,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015discussion-draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
21. Miles L. Galbraith, Identity Crisis: Seeking A Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing
for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365 (2013)
(recommending a relaxation of the requirement that a future injury be “imminent” if it is to
qualify as injury in fact); Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and the Third-Party
Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119 (2015) (same).
22. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283 (2013)
(proposing that courts calculate the expected value of a future injury when analyzing to find
injury-in-fact).
23. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) [hereinafter Amnesty
Int’l USA].
24. See ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800–03.
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ability of consumers to bring private data breach claims. Part III then
demonstrates how plaintiffs have turned to more creative theories to
show injury-in-fact, particularly the potential-future-injury theory. It
also shows how the judiciary’s focus on this theory has resulted in an
unclear, inconsistent standard in private data breach cases. Lastly, Part
IV demonstrates how recognizing a legal right to privacy for personal
data held by a third party can resolve the injury-in-fact issues facing
data breach plaintiffs and allow courts to better focus on current
controversies rather than potential future harms. It concludes by
showing how the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in
Amnesty Int’l USA can be applied in private data breach cases to
effectively balance consumers’ rights with constitutional
justiciability limitations.
II. STANDING AND THE INJURY-IN-FACT REQUIREMENT
Plaintiffs in data breach claims often find themselves arguing
issues involving the United States Constitution at the very start of
litigation. 25 Article III of the United States Constitution limits
federal judicial power to the resolution of “Cases” and
“Controversies.” 26 From this language, the United States Supreme
Court has established a set of rules that limit a plaintiff ’s ability to
bring a claim. 27 These rules are often called the justiciability doctrine,

25. See Cease, supra note 17, at 398–404.
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
27. James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-inFact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV.
1, 2 (2001).
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which includes concepts such as ripeness, 28 mootness, 29 political
questions, 30 and standing. 31
The aspect of justiciability that arises most often in data breach
claims is the standing requirement. 32 If a plaintiff cannot demonstrate
that she has standing to bring a claim, a court will dismiss the case
before reaching the merits. 33 To meet the standing requirement, a
plaintiff must show: 1) that she has suffered an “injury-in-fact,” 2)
that the injury is traceable to the defendant, and 3) that the requested
relief will redress the injury. 34 The first standing requirement—
“injury-in-fact”—is usually the justiciability hurdle that data breach
plaintiffs have the most difficulty in overcoming. 35 To sufficiently
demonstrate injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must show an injury that is
“concrete and particularized,” or “actual or imminent,” and that is
not “conjectural or hypothetical.” 36 In other words, a plaintiff must
prove that he has a personal stake in the litigation by “show[ing] that
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” 37
28. Ripeness “seeks to separate matters that are premature for review.” ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d. ed. 2009). There is some overlap between
ripeness and the injury requirement in standing doctrine, but ripeness is perhaps best understood
as a question of when courts can grant pre-enforcement review of a statute or regulation. Id.; see
also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 161 (1987).
29. The mootness doctrine requires that the controversy be live at all points of the
litigation, not just the outset. For example, if a criminal defendant dies during an appeal, the
case becomes moot. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 97; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974).
30. The political question doctrine refers to the rule that some questions should be left
to the political branches of government, rather than heard by the court. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 28, at 103; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
31. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 45–46.
32. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation – A Tough Road for
Plaintiffs, 55 BOS. B.J. 27, 29 (2011).
33. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (“As we conclude that the
Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that the [plaintiff] lacked standing to maintain this
action, we do not reach any other questions presented in the petition, and we intimate no view
on the merits of the complaint.”).
34. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
35. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1376.
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff in
an environmental case lacked standing to challenge certain environmental regulations).
37. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Leonard &
Brant, supra note 27, at 2.
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Usually, plaintiffs can easily demonstrate injury-in-fact by pointing
to a physical or financial harm. In most cases where a plaintiff alleges
one of these types of damage, courts do not even address the injuryin-fact requirement. The injury is so obvious to each party that the
question is not disputed. The United States Supreme Court has also
recognized that, even when a plaintiff does not have physical or
financial harm, congressional actions can create individual legal rights
that qualify a plaintiff for the injury-in-fact requirement. 38 If one of
these legislatively created rights is violated, it “can confer standing to
sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially
cognizable injury in the absence of statute.” 39 The same principle
applies to constitutionally created rights.
But even when a plaintiff does not have a legislative or
constitutional right, and cannot show a physical or financial harm,
she still may be able to qualify for the injury-in-fact requirement. 40
Courts have often recognized injury-in-fact in cases where, in
absence of a financial harm, plaintiffs allege an abstract, intangible,
or even “spiritual” injury. 41 For example, plaintiffs have qualified
for standing without showing a physical or financial harm in actions
for trespass, defamation, breaches of contract, and loss of
recreational opportunities. 42

38. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973) (“Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute.”).
39. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
40. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 275, 281 (2008).
41. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1377.
42. See Hulle v. Orynge, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, Mich, pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in A.K.R.
KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 128–32 (1957) (trespass); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (defamation); Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 77 (1st
Cir. 2014) (breach of contract); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000) (loss of recreational opportunities). In many of these cases, courts have
not only held that the plaintiffs do qualify under the injury-in-fact requirement even without
physical or financial harm, but have often awarded nominal damages to the plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 112 (“In the absence of proven or actual damages, plaintiffs are
entitled to nominal damages in an action for trespass. The limited right to recover nominal
damages in an action for trespass to real property is appropriate when needed to protect an
important right, even absent any substantial loss or injury.”); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ch. VI, §§ 96–109, at 164–91 (Arthur G. Sedgwick
& Joseph H. Beale eds., 9th ed. 1920) (listing hundreds of cases awarding nominal damages for
violations of non-economic rights).
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However, most courts in data breach cases have been hesitant to
recognize the loss of personal data as the same kind of justiciable
“intangible injury” recognized in trespass actions. 43 These courts often
insist that the loss of personal data by itself is not enough to qualify as
injury-in-fact. 44 Courts usually ask data breach plaintiffs to show that
their data was not only stolen, but also misused in a way that resulted
in additional, economic damage. 45
This insistence upon economic damage causes problems for many
data breach plaintiffs. In many cases, consumers who have had their
personal information accessed bring claims against companies soon
after they learn about the data breach—often before a third-party
hacker uses the information to attempt identity theft or credit card
fraud. 46 Thus, many data breach plaintiffs are turned away for lack of
standing and are therefore unable to present the merits of their claims.
Faced with this difficulty in establishing injury-in-fact,
consumers have developed increasingly creative theories to overcome
the obstacle. Some courts have accepted these creative theories, 47
perhaps recognizing some injustice in requiring a consumer to wait
patiently for his information to be used against him before he is
allowed to bring a claim. However, many other courts have been
hesitant to recognize these more creative methods of qualifying for
the injury-in-fact requirement. 48

43. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1379.
44. See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D.
Minn. 2006).
45. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1379. It is also possible that the “third-party doctrine”
has an influence on courts in data breach cases. The third-party doctrine states that when a
person voluntarily gives information to a third party, the person foregoes any privacy rights he
has in that information. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); see also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Though the third-party doctrine has never been
explicitly raised in a data breach case, since it was created and has been discussed almost
exclusively in the context of 4th amendment searches and seizures, see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561 (2009) (defending the third party
doctrine and analyzing cases where it has been applied), some commentators have suggested
that the third-party doctrine is one of the reasons that courts are hesitant to grant standing to
data breach victims. See Lamparello, supra note 21, at 120.
46. See Cease, supra note 17, at 399.
47. See infra Section III.B.
48. John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data
Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3,
27 (2014).

1296

5.BEATTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1289

11/19/2016 1:35 PM

Standing Room Only

III. CONSUMER ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY FOR STANDING
Consumers have asserted many different theories of injury-in-fact
in their struggle to overcome the hurdle posed by the standing
requirement. These theories range from a theory of injury through
emotional distress to a theory of breach of implied contract. 49 But
perhaps the most common theory of injury that data breach plaintiffs
have come to rely on is the theory of potential-future-injury.
A. The Potential-Future-Injury Theory
The potential-future-injury theory is based on the idea that,
though an event has not caused injury to the plaintiff yet, it has
increased the risk of an injury occurring in the future. Possibly the
most common use of this theory has been outside of data breach
settings, in cases involving environmental protection, such as Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife 50 and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw. 51 The
Supreme Court’s reasoning in these decisions has framed much of the
debate in other potential-future-injury cases, including many private
data breach cases.
In the frequently cited Lujan case, an environmental organization
challenged new regulations that changed the effect of the Endangered
Species Act. 52 The new regulations allowed the federal government to
avoid certain statutory obligations for projects outside of the United
States. 53 One plaintiff, a member of an environmental organization,
claimed that the new regulations “w[ould] seriously reduce
endangered . . . species habitat” in areas that she had previously
visited. 54 The plaintiff claimed that she had suffered an injury-in-fact
because she “intend[ed] to return to [the foreign habitats] in the
future.” 55 The U.S. Supreme Court was not convinced by this
theory—especially after one plaintiff admitted that she did not have
current plans to visit the habitat, because it was in the middle of a

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 28–30, 55, 60.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id.
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country embroiled in a civil war. 56 The Court held that “‘some day’
intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any
specification of when the some day will be” were not sufficient to
establish standing. 57
The Lujan decision did not put a stop to environmental claims
based on abstract theories of potential future injury-in-fact. Eight
years later, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs.
(TOC), Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court again faced a case involving
environmental harm, and this time the Court came to a different
conclusion. 58 In Friends of the Earth, an environmental organization
sued Laidlaw for discharging excessive amounts of pollutants into a
river. 59 The organization claimed injury-in-fact on the theory that the
pollution had limited local residents’ ability to use the river for
recreation. 60 For example, one member of the organization stated that
he lived a half-mile from Laidlaw’s facility; that he occasionally drove
over the . . . [r]iver, and that it looked and smelled polluted; and that
he would like to fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near the river
between 3 and 15 miles downstream from the facility, as he did when
he was a teenager, but would not do so because he was concerned
that the water was polluted by Laidlaw’s discharges. 61

The Court stated that these kinds of “conditional statements” could
not be equated with the “speculative ‘some day’ intentions” in Lujan,

56. Id. at 563–64.
57. Id. at 564. But see id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the plaintiffs did
have standing since “[a]n injury to an individual’s interest in studying or enjoying a species and
its natural habitat occurs when someone . . . takes action that harms the species and habitat.”);
id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that plaintiffs did have standing since a fact finder
could conclude, based on the plaintiffs “statements of intent to return, . . . past visits to the
[habitats], as well as their professional backgrounds, that it was likely that [the plaintiffs] would
make a return trip to the [habitats].”).
58. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
59. Id. at 176.
60. Id. at 181–83.
61. Id. at 181–82 (The other members of the organization made similar statements.
One member stated that she no longer picnicked, walked, or birdwatched near the river out
of concerns about pollutants. Another attested that her home had a lower value than similar
homes located farther from Laidlaw’s facility.); see also id. at 183 (Another member averred
that he had canoed downriver from the facility, and would like to canoe closer, but would not
because of the pollutants.).
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and held that the Friends of the Earth members did meet the injuryin-fact requirement. 62
These two cases laid out the principles of the potential-futureinjury theory. The Supreme Court realized that recognizing all
potential future injuries as injuries-in-fact could unduly expand the
power of federal courts. 63 To address this concern, the Court limited
the theory’s applicability to injuries that are “actual or imminent,” and
not merely “hypothetical.” 64 The theory was then picked up by private
data breach plaintiffs in their efforts to overcome the injury-in-fact
hurdle created by the standing doctrine. However, many courts have
been hesitant to recognize injury-in-fact for data breach plaintiffs that
rely on a potential-future-injury theory of harm.
B. The Potential-Future-Injury Theory in Private Data Breach Claims
Plaintiffs with private data breach claims usually advance the
potential-future-injury theory using two arguments. First, plaintiffs
contend that the unauthorized access to their personal data has
increased the likelihood that they will suffer financial damage in the
future, such as by identity theft or fraudulent charges on their bank
accounts. 65 As a corollary to this theory, plaintiffs sometimes also
argue that they have suffered current financial harm because they
have spent money trying to mitigate future injuries, such as by
62. Id. at 184.
63. Hessick, supra note 40, at 297; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992).
64. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see
also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned
speculation”); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (denying standing to
an individual seeking to challenge police chokehold because it was only speculative that the
plaintiff would be subjected to chokehold); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 171–72 n.2
(1977) (denying standing in a claim challenging police use of deadly force against a person
attempting to escape arrest); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying
standing to residents who sought injunctive relief against judges allegedly engaged in a pattern
and practice of discriminatory practices on the ground that the threat to plaintiffs from this
discrimination was only “speculation and conjecture”); Golden v. Zwickler 394 U.S. 103, 109
(1969) (denying standing for a claim based on the potential future candidacy of a former
Congressman); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947) (stating that a
“hypothetical threat [of enforcement] is not enough” for jurisdiction); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v.
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying
standing for claim of speculative future injury), modified on reh’g by 513 F.3d 234 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
65. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 28.
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purchasing credit monitoring services. 66 While other plaintiffs have
advanced alternative theories of harm, such as emotional damage 67
or breach of implied contract, 68 the potential-future-injury theory
has been the most common. 69
Circuit courts have come to different conclusions in the
application of these two theories to private data breach cases. For
example, in 2011, the Third Circuit addressed the potential-futureinjury theory in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. 70 In Reilly, a hacker infiltrated
Ceridian’s computer system, which held the personal and financial
information of up to 27,000 employees at 1,900 companies. 71 The
personal data included names, addresses, Social Security numbers,
dates of birth, and bank account information. 72 Neither the plaintiffs
nor Ceridian Corp. knew for certain whether the hacker actually read,
copied, or used the personal data. 73 After the breach, Ceridian Corp.
sent letters to notify the employees of the event, and arranged for one
year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection. 74
Even though Ceridian Corp. voluntarily offered credit monitoring
and protection, some employees filed suit against the company. To
establish injury-in-fact, the employees relied on the potential-futureinjury theory, claiming that they suffered an increased risk of identity
theft because of the data breach. 75 The Third Circuit, however, held
that the employees’ “string of hypothetical injuries” did not meet the
injury-in-fact requirement. 76 Specifically, the court noted that the
employees could not show that the hacker actually read the
66. Id. at 16–17.
67. Id. at 46–47. The plaintiffs in both Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. and a similar case, Krottner
v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), asserted the emotional distress theory of
injury. The Krottner court, which had accepted the “potential future harm” theory, also accepted
the emotional distress contention, while the Reilly court, which did not accept the “potential
future harm” argument, also rejected the plaintiff’s emotional distress argument. Id. at 1142;
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45–46 (3d. Cir. 2011).
68. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 37–39; see also Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64,
72 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a breach-of-contract theory could establish injury-in-fact).
69. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 17.
70. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 38.
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 44.
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information, or that the hacker intended to misuse the data. Because
“there [was] no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or
malicious,” the potential future harm was not sufficiently imminent to
qualify as injury-in-fact. 77
Though the Third Circuit did not find injury-in-fact in Reilly,
other circuits have found injury-in-fact when applying the same
potential-future-injury test in a similar data breach situation. For
example, in 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
potential-future-injury theory in Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp. 78 In
Pisciotta, banking customers alleged that Old National Bancorp failed
to adequately secure their personal information. 79 The plaintiffs
claimed the bank suffered a security breach, and the plaintiffs’
information was accessed by a third party. 80 The plaintiffs whose data
had been accessed did not claim to have suffered any “completed direct
financial loss to their accounts,” or claim that they were victims of
identity theft. 81 Instead, they claimed to have suffered “substantial
potential economic damages,” and added that they had incurred
expenses to mitigate the potential-future-injury. 82 The Seventh Circuit
accepted these facts as sufficient to qualify the plaintiffs for the injuryin-fact requirement. 83 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit stated the
plaintiffs qualified for the injury-in-fact requirement because “[e]ven
a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or
controversy—to take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical.”84

77. Id. The Third Circuit apparently envisioned a possibility that a third-party hacker
could either unintentionally penetrate a company’s firewall to gain access to personal employee
information, or would intentionally do so, but for non-malicious reasons.
78. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 631.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 632 (emphasis in original).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 632, 634.
84. Id. at 634 n.4 (citing Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)).
The Seventh Circuit also noted that in other areas of tort law such as toxic tort and medical
malpractice, “a cognizable injury for standing purposes” is created even when exposure to toxic
substances or defective medical devices only increase the risk of future harm. See e.g., Pisciotta,
499 F.3d at 634 n.3 (citing Denney v. Deustche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006)
(toxic tort); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (defective
medical device); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947–48 (9th Cir.
2002) (environmental tort); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204
F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (environmental tort)).
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In 2010, the Ninth Circuit also accepted the potential-futureinjury theory of injury-in-fact in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. 85 In
Krottner, a laptop containing the names, addresses, and Social Security
numbers of 97,000 employees was stolen from a Starbucks store in
Washington. 86 Starbucks informed the affected employees of the theft
and offered a year of credit watch services so that employees could
monitor for identity theft. 87 Two employees filed a lawsuit against
Starbucks over the incident. 88 Both employees alleged that after
receiving the letter, they spent “a substantial amount of time”
monitoring their 401(k) and bank accounts to prevent identity theft.89
One of the plaintiffs was notified by his bank that someone had tried
to open a new account using his Social Security number, but that the
bank closed the account; the plaintiff suffered no financial loss. 90 The
Ninth Circuit court held that because there was a “credible threat of
real and immediate harm stemming from the theft,” the plaintiffs
qualified under the injury-in-fact requirement. 91
These cases illustrate the different results that courts can reach
when faced with largely similar data breach fact patterns. In
Krottner, the Ninth Circuit found injury-in-fact when a third party
stole a laptop with a plaintiff ’s financial data. 92 And in Pisciotta, the
Seventh Circuit did find injury-in-fact when a third party breached
a bank’s network and accessed the plaintiff ’s financial data. 93 Yet in
Reilly, the Third Circuit did not find injury-in-fact when a hacker
infiltrated a company’s network and accessed a plaintiff ’s personal
and financial data. 94

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1140.
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007).
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d. Cir. 2011).
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C. Difficulty and Inconsistency in Applying the Potential-FutureInjury Theory
The results in these data breach cases illustrate the difficulties and
inconsistencies that invariably arise when courts apply the potentialfuture-injury theory. Circuits that have addressed the theory have
often come to opposing results, even in situations with similar fact
patterns. 95 Circuit courts have applied the test in similar factual
scenarios, and have reached completely different results.
This inconsistency arises because applying the potential-futureinjury test requires courts to peer into the future to determine how
likely it is that a future risk will actually occur. Not only does this
approach result in inconsistent results, it also arguably stretches the
doctrine of standing farther than the Constitution intended.96
Recognizing all potential future risks seems to contradict the idea that
justiciable claims must be based on a “case[]” or “controvers[y].” 97
Instead of analyzing what has happened already, the theory requires
courts to decide if something will happen in the future.
These inconsistent results have caused uncertainty in the law
surrounding private data breach claims. 98 As noted above, some
circuits seem to be more lenient when applying the potential-futureinjury theory than others. As yet, courts have not established a
uniform test for applying the potential-future-injury theory in data
breach cases that achieves consistent results. 99 Overall, the potentialfuture-injury theory stretches the case or controversy concept to
unrecognizable limits, asks courts to predict the future, and achieves
inconsistent results—the theory is not a reliable way to govern private
data breach cases in a modern, digital age.

95. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1369 n.22.
96. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Given the multiple
strands of speculation and surmise from which the plaintiff’s hypothesis is woven, finding
standing in this case would stretch the injury requirement past its breaking point.”); Patricia
Cave, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand on: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier
from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 784 (2013)
(arguing that allowing an increased risk of harm to qualify as standing in all data breach cases
would “[s]tretch[] the [d]octrine to [i]ts [l]imits”).
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
98. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 29.
99. Cease, supra note 17, at 421. But see Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 29
(analyzing case law to identify some common factors used by courts in resolving the injury-infact issue).
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IV. A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THE PRIVATE DATA BREACH PROBLEM
The standing doctrine, particularly the injury-in-fact requirement,
has hindered the goals of both consumers and courts in private data
breach cases. Obviously, consumers are inconvenienced when they are
barred from bringing an action when a third party steals their personal
data. Consumers must choose between bringing a claim before their
personal data is used against them (which involves litigating a
threshold constitutional issue), or waiting for their data to be misused
before bringing the action.
The standing doctrine also puts courts in an uncomfortable
situation. Because plaintiffs can only prove injury-in-fact through the
potential-future-injury theory, courts are required to engage in
guesswork to determine whether a future injury is a “credible threat
of real or immediate harm” 100 or a mere “string of hypothetical
injuries.” 101 Courts addressing this theory must attempt to foresee the
future, which is precisely the activity that the “cases and controversies”
language in the Constitution is designed to prevent.
A. Proposed Methods of Addressing the Problem
Many commentators have attempted to solve the standing
problem for private data breach claims. Their solutions have ranged
from comprehensive data security legislation, 102 to relaxing the
requirement that an injury be imminent, 103 to recognizing the
“expected value” of potential future financial harm as sufficient to
meet injury-in-fact. 104 These solutions could help clarify the law
surrounding injury-in-fact, but none of them are an instant cure-all.
Some may introduce as many problems as they solve, and all of the
proposals would likely be complicated to adopt. These complications
have meant that, so far, courts have been hesitant to adopt any of
these solutions.
Many scholars have called for Congress to step in and regulate the
area of data security, stating that “more comprehensive federal

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).
Galbraith, supra note 21; see Cave, supra note 96, at 789.
See Lamparello, supra note 21.
See Nash, supra note 22.
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legislation is necessary to protect consumers from cybersecurity
threats.” 105 The first proposed solution—comprehensive federal
legislation—would be the most all-encompassing way to deal with the
problem. Comprehensive legislation would establish individual
privacy rights, and could also provide a unique standard for courts to
use when addressing whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a claim.
Even the executive branch has called for legislation to be enacted, first
by publishing an executive report calling for Congressional action,106
and then proposing a bill of its own that would establish
comprehensive regulatory change. 107 As yet, however, no federal
legislation has been enacted, leaving only a “constantly changing
patchwork of state laws.” 108
While comprehensive legislation in this area of law may be the
ideal solution, there is no telling when or if federal legislation will be
enacted. Bills intended to regulate data security have been proposed
to both houses of Congress since at least 2006. 109 Currently, there are
numerous bills before the 114th session of Congress that seek to
regulate data security on a large scale. 110 However, most of the bills
from previous years did not make it past the committee stage, and as
of yet, none of the current bills have passed a House or Senate vote. 111
Moreover, many of the bills that have been proposed would not
address the standing issue for many data breach plaintiffs even if they
were enacted. Generally, the bills do not focus on recognizing an

105. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1375.
106. Exec. Office of the President, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
107. Exec. Office of the President, supra note 20.
108. Julie A. Heitzenrater, Data Breach Notification Legislation: Recent Developments, 4
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 661, 663 (2009).
109. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2006); Data
Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007).
110. See, e.g., Secure Data Act of 2015, S. 135, 114th Cong. (2015); Secure Data Act of
2015, H.R. 726, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (2015);
Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach
Notification Act of 2015, H.R. 1770, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach
Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015); Secure and Protect Americans’ Data Act,
H.R. 4187, 114th Cong. (2015).
111. The furthest along at the time of writing are House Bill 2205, and House Bill
1770, which were sent to the House for consideration on December 9, 2015 and April 15,
2015 respectively.
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individual right against unauthorized access to data, but instead focus
on requiring companies to notify individuals if their information has
been subject to unauthorized access. 112 Even if one of the notificationfocused bills were enacted by Congress, it would only give individuals
a claim if their data was accessed and the company did not notify them
of the breach; it would not give an individual the right to pursue a
claim based on the breach alone. A federal act of this type would not
necessarily help the plight of data breach victims, since many states
already have notification laws in place. 113
The second proposed solution to solve the data breach standing
problem is to retain the potential-future-injury theory, but relax the
requirement that harms must be imminent to qualify as injury-infact. 114 Scholars that make this suggestion generally agree with the
concept of the potential-future-injury theory, but argue that courts
have been too strict in their insistence that a future injury must be
impending. 115 Proponents of this method typically make the same
arguments that were used in the opinions in Krottner and Pisciotta,
reasoning that if the future-injury framework is good enough for toxic
exposure, medical defect, and environmental cases, then it should also
work for data breach cases. 116 While adopting this approach may better
protect individual consumers’ rights, it would not solve many of the
problems that currently afflict the potential-future-injury theory.
Retaining the potential-future-injury framework would still
require courts to predict the future by forcing them to consider a
possible future occurrence instead of allowing them to focus on a
present “controversy.” Courts would probably still come to
inconsistent results, even if the standard is relaxed. 117 Retaining the
future-injury standard would not eliminate the difficulty courts have
had in applying the standard—it would only move the goalposts, not
change the rules of the game. Keeping the potential-future-injury
standard, even in a relaxed form, would probably result in a legal
environment that is just as muddied as it is today.
112. See Heitzenrater, supra note 108, at 676; see also H.R. 1770; S. 177.
113. Michael E. Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private
Sectors, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 555, 574 (2008).
114. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1387; Lamparello, supra note 21, at 128.
115. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1387.
116. Id. at 1388–96.
117. See supra Section III.C.
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A third proposed solution is for courts to adopt an “expected
value” model of analyzing future injuries. 118 Jonathan Nash, in his
article, Standing’s Expected Value, argues that courts should resolve
the standing question by deciding whether a plaintiff has suffered a
harm with a positive “expected value.” 119 This value would be
calculated by multiplying the probability of a future harm by its likely
magnitude. 120 If the value of that calculation “would be sufficient to
support standing were it to arise as a typical ‘actual harm,’” then the
plaintiff’s damage would qualify as injury-in-fact. 121
This alternative method of analyzing injury-in-fact would be a
unique way to solve the future-injury issue. On first glance, it would
give courts a clear, numerical way to calculate whether a potential
future harm qualifies. However, this method would actually worsen
the problem in other ways. The “expected value” method would still
require courts to predict the future, rather than focus on present
controversies. But in addition to the future-gazing that courts do now,
they would also need to quantify both the magnitude of any potential
harm, and its probability of occurring. Though Nash contends that
courts routinely quantify similar risks when setting bail or a
preliminary injunction, 122 those quantification processes differ from
the proposed method for quantifying data breach claims. For example,
to set bail, one of the factors courts use is a defendant’s financial
circumstances. 123 Having a certain, established figure to start from
undoubtedly makes the process of setting bail much easier. With the
“expected value” method, courts would not have the benefit of
starting from a set figure, but would have to speculate to create both
the magnitude of possible damages and the probability of the damages
occurring. Applying such an uncertain method without any concrete
starting point would probably result in the same inconsistency and
uncertainty that plagues data breach victims today. 124

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Nash, supra note 22, at 1306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1316–19.
18 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 149.
See supra Section III.C.
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B. A Simpler Solution
Most of the solutions posited by scholars and policymakers would
require either comprehensive legislation, or a completely new judicial
standard. However, there is a simple, easy solution that would better
apply the standing doctrine with only minimum changes to the
current law. This solution is possible because a workable standard has
already been established—in the specific setting of unauthorized
access to personal data—by the United States Supreme Court. 125 Not
only has the Supreme Court established the relevant standard, the
standard has also already been applied by a Circuit Court in a similar
case. 126 This ready-made standard already exists, more closely follows
the standing requirement, and would be much easier to apply than the
current uncertainty of the potential-future-injury theory.
1. The injury-in-fact standard in government cases
Two recent cases, Amnesty Int’l USA 127 and Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Clapper, 128 created a workable injury-in-fact standard that
could easily be used by courts to analyze private data breach actions.
The standard has already proven effective in preventing frivolous data
breach claims, while still allowing plaintiffs who have experienced an
actual loss to have their day in court.
The Supreme Court case that established the standard was
Amnesty Int’l USA. 129 In Amnesty Int’l USA, the Supreme Court ruled
on a constitutional challenge to a 2008 amendment to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 130 FISA was originally enacted in
1978 to regulate government electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence. 131 In 2007, prompted by a perceived need to combat
terrorism, the Executive branch of the U.S. Government asked
Congress to amend the FISA to expand the government’s authority
to use electronic surveillance. 132 Congress obliged by enacting the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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See Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
See ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1138.
785 F.3d at 787.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1138.
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 101 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
Id. at 1144.
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FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 133 which “established a new and
independent source of intelligence collection authority, beyond that
granted in traditional FISA.” 134
After the amendments were enacted, Amnesty International USA,
an organization of human rights activists, sued James R. Clapper, the
Director of National Intelligence, claiming that the new amendment
violated the constitutional protections against illegal search and
seizure in the Fourth Amendment. 135 The activists sought an
injunction against Clapper to prohibit him from ordering electronic
surveillance under the newly amended act. 136 To address the issue of
injury-in-fact, the activists claimed that because their work required
them “to engage in sensitive international communications with
individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance,” they
were particularly sensitive to future government surveillance.137
Therefore, the activists claimed they had suffered injury-in-fact when
the amendment was passed, since the amendment created “an
objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would
be intercepted by the government in the future. 138 The activists also
argued that, in the alternative, they had suffered injury-in-fact because
they had undertaken “costly and burdensome measures to protect the
confidentiality of their international communications.” 139
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed with both of the
activists’ theories. 140 The Court stated that, even if the amendment
made the possibility of future surveillance more likely, such a future
possibility was too speculative to meet the injury-in-fact

133. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2008); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2008).
134. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1143; 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON,
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS §§ 3.1, 3.7 (2d ed. 2012). The
amended version of the statute allowed the government to start surveillance without
demonstrating probable cause that the target was a foreign power. It also did not require the
government to specify the nature and location where the surveillance would take place.
135. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. The Fourth Amendment protects U.S.
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2012).
136. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1142.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1143.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1142.
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requirement. 141 Instead of an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of
future injury, the Court reiterated that the correct standard was
whether the threatened injury was “certainly impending.” 142 In
rejecting the first theory of injury, the Court stated that the theory
was too speculative to satisfy the requirement that an injury be
“certainly impending.” 143 The Court also rejected the activists’ second
theory of injury-in-fact, stating that the activists were not allowed to
“manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on
hypothetical future harm that [was] not certainly impending.” 144
The Amnesty Int’l USA decision is not the only time this injuryin-fact standard has been applied to unauthorized government access
to data. In an even more recent decision, published in May 2015, the
Second Circuit was faced with a similar situation to the one that
confronted the Supreme Court two years earlier. 145 The case, Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, was another challenge to government
surveillance. 146 Though the fact patterns were largely similar, the
Second Circuit distinguished the ACLU plaintiff ’s situation from that
of the plaintiffs in Amnesty Int’l USA. 147 Because of that distinction,
the Second Circuit court held that the ACLU plaintiffs did have
injury-in-fact, and were thus able to reach Article III standing. 148
ACLU v. Clapper involved a challenge to the government’s
ability to collect data about American citizens under the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001. 149 Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act,
the government was allowed to order certain common carriers
(including telephone companies) to provide business records to the
government whenever there were “specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records
pertain[ed] [wa]s a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 150

141. Id. at 1141.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (U.S. 1990)).
144. Id. at 1143.
145. ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 801–02.
148. Id. at 802.
149. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287.
150. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795; see also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105–272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410–11 (1998).
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However, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 151 expanded the
government’s power to not only collect “business records,” but also
“any tangible things.” 152 The amendments also eliminated the
restrictions on the types of businesses the government orders could
reach. 153 Lastly, the amendments loosened the requirements from
requiring “specific and articulable facts” that give reason to believe
that the person is a foreign agent, to requiring only a showing that
there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.” 154
Using this expanded power, the government initiated a program
to collect data for foreign surveillance purposes. 155 Under the
program, the government ordered telephone companies to provide
them “call detail records or ‘telephony metadata.’” 156 Though this
“metadata” did not include the contents of the phone calls themselves,
it did include information that could be considered sensitive and
private. 157 The government program, which began in 2006, collected

151. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287.
152. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795.
153. Id. The current statute allows the collection of “any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1).
154. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795; 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
155. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795.
156. Id.; see also Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government
Surveillance, 2016 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5) (discussing how the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court attempted to limit, as much as it could, the
government’s bulk collection of telephone metadata).
157. See id. at 793–94. Telephony metadata is not the contents, or voice conversations, of
phone calls themselves, but rather details about phone calls. In one of the government orders
that was contested in this case, “telephony metadata” was defined as “including but not limited
to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number,
International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and
time and duration of call.” In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from
Redacted, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). This information can be used
to identify specific devices and users. Then, paired with information about the length of a call,
and the number that the user called, it can reveal private information. For example, the
government could use the information to discover that a user has called a suicide hotline, alcohol
addiction recovery hotline, HIV testing service, or phone-sex service. See Brief for Experts in
Computer and Data Science, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (No.
14-42), 2014 WL 1118041 at *5–9.
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information from all calls made both within the United States, and
between the United States and abroad. 158
The plaintiffs in ACLU claimed that the government practice of
collecting metadata in bulk, and “on an ongoing daily basis,” was not
within the scope that Congress authorized in the Patriot Act
amendments. 159 Before the Second Circuit could decide the ultimate
issue of whether the program was authorized by statute, however, it
had to address the threshold question of whether the plaintiffs had
Article III standing. 160
The Second Circuit held that the ACLU plaintiffs had alleged
sufficient injury to establish Article III standing. 161 Unlike in Amnesty
Int’l USA, where the plaintiffs “had not established standing because
they could not show that the government was surveilling them,” 162 the
ACLU plaintiffs’ claims “require no speculation,” since they had
already “presented evidence that their data [we]re being collected.”163
Therefore, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs did have injuryin-fact, and eventually held that the government program was not
within the Patriot Act’s authorized scope. 164
Taken together, these two cases create a clear, workable standard
of addressing injury-in-fact in an unauthorized data-access setting.
According to the Amnesty Int’l USA standard, if plaintiffs can show
that a third party actually accessed their data, the harm is concrete
enough to qualify as injury-in-fact because it “requires no
speculation.” 165 The ACLU plaintiffs met this requirement because the
government admitted that it had copied the plaintiff ’s data from the
phone companies’ records and conducted searches through the
database containing the plaintiff’s information. 166 On the other hand,
if plaintiffs cannot show that a third party actually accessed their
personal data, the harm is too speculative to qualify for the injury-infact requirement. The Amnesty Int’l USA plaintiffs could not meet this

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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standard since they were only contesting the amendment to FISA.167
They did not allege that the government had actually used the
amended FISA to access their personal information. 168
The courts in these two cases had a much different discussion
about the standing doctrine and the injury-in-fact requirement than
courts in private data breach cases. 169 In Amnesty Int’l USA and
ACLU, instead of speculating on whether unauthorized access to data
could cause some uncertain future harm, the courts asked a
straightforward question—had the government actually stolen the
plaintiffs’ data, or not? 170 Asking this question effectively balances the
two competing interests behind the data privacy debate. The Amnesty
Int’l USA standard distinguishes frivolous, unnecessary claims, where
the claimants’ personal data has not actually been accessed (like the
claim in Amnesty Int’l USA), from the reasonable claims where
personal data has been accessed (similar to that in ACLU).
The Amnesty Int’l USA standard applies the constitutional
doctrine of standing without requiring courts to speculate on
potential future harms. Courts can address present facts instead
of using their time to calculate the probability of an uncertain,
future event.
2. Applying the government standard to private data breach cases
Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU created a strange dynamic in data
privacy law. The two cases recognized that plaintiffs could meet the
injury-in-fact requirement if the government accessed their personal
information—even if that information was only metadata. And yet, in
private data breach cases such as Reilly, the legal system is often
unwilling to recognize that a plaintiff can reach injury-in-fact if a
private party accesses personal information—even if that information
includes sensitive financial data. 171 This discrepancy seems awkward
and even unfair—to a person who has had his data stolen, it may seem

167. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.
168. Id.
169. Compare id. at 1146–49, and ACLU, F.3d at 801–03, with Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011).
170. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1148; ACLU, 785 F.3d at 801.
171. See supra Introduction.
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that courts care more about who stole his information, than what kind
of information was stolen.
Fortunately, the solution to this unusual discrepancy does not
require comprehensive change. Instead, the discrepancy can be
resolved by using the standard established by Amnesty Int’l USA in
private data breach actions. Admittedly, some courts in private data
breach cases have already discussed the Amnesty Int’l USA decision.172
However, the standard’s translation to private cases has been uneasy.
Some of the courts using the standard in private cases have claimed
that the “certainly impending” language affects the law of standing,
while others claim that it does not change the rule. 173
The reason that the Amnesty Int’l USA standard has been an
uneasy fit in private cases—and the missing link to its effective use—is
that individuals currently have a statutory right against government
collection of data, but do not have a statutory right against private
collection of data. In an ideal world, legislatures would solve this
problem by creating a statutory right to reasonable data security
against third party hackers. Legislatures would not necessarily have to
create the kind of comprehensive scheme that many scholars have
envisioned—they could simply create the right, and formally adopt the
Amnesty Int’l USA injury-in-fact standard to efficiently apply the
standing doctrine.
Even if legislatures do not create a statutory right to reasonable
data security, courts may recognize the principle as a common-law
right—just as past courts recognized a previously unknown common-

172. See infra note 173.
173. See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 82–93. Some courts have used Amnesty Int’l
USA’s language to dismiss private data reach claims, implying that the opinion may have
strengthened the requirement that potential future harms be imminent. See In re Barnes &
Noble Pin Pad Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *7–12 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013);
Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875–79 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014);
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651–57 (S.D. Ohio 2014). Other
courts have cited to the Amnesty Int’l USA holding, but still found injury-in-fact, implying (and
sometimes stating outright), that the Amnesty Int’l USA opinion did not change the law of
standing in any significant way. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th
Cir. 2015); In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 996
F. Supp. 2d 942, 960–63 (S.D. Cal. 2014); Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *14–16 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1221–24 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). Overall, it is clear that the
inconsistency and uncertainty around private data breach cases has continued.
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law right to privacy in tort law. 174 The recognition of this right would
make it easy to apply the efficient, clear Amnesty Int’l USA standard
to private cases.
Recognition of this right is the missing link to allow courts to
comfortably apply the Amnesty Int’l USA standard. If plaintiffs could
show that a third party has already accessed or collected their personal
data (for example, by showing attempted draw on an account or the
theft of a laptop), they would qualify for the injury-in-fact
requirement. On the other hand, if plaintiffs did not claim that a third
party had actually accessed or collected their data, they would not
satisfy the injury-in-fact standard.
The application of the Amnesty Int’l USA standard to private
cases would eliminate the need for the difficult and speculative
potential-future-injury theory. By applying this standard, courts
could better focus on present “cases” and “controversies,” rather
than searching for hypothetical future injuries. 175 They would be
better equipped to handle a modern, digital age where people have
to give personal information to third parties on a daily basis—
instead of trying to fit the square pegs of pre-digital standards into
the round hole of modern reality.
Some may argue that the recognition of an individual right to
privacy in data breach cases would result in too much litigation over
consumer data breaches. Such a concern may be valid if courts were
to recognize an unlimited right to privacy without adopting any
standards for discerning between frivolous claims and valid ones.
But the ACLU decision already demonstrated that the Amnesty
Int’l USA standard is capable of discerning between serious and
frivolous claims. 176
Even if the recognition of a right to data security results in an
increase in data breach litigation, the increase would be a reasonable
price to pay if it also increased individual consumer’s protection
against unauthorized access to sensitive personal data. The American

174. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890) (arguing for a private right of privacy); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (Super.
1893) (an early case that recognized the right to privacy, or that “now the right to life has come
to mean the privilege to enjoy life without the publicity or annoyance of a lottery contest waged
without authority”).
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
176. See supra Section IV.B.1.
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legal system has already proven that it can enforce individual data
privacy rights in certain industries, such as healthcare, 177 as long as
courts have a workable standard for dividing the reasonable claims
from the unreasonable. As long as recognition of the right also came
with a workable standard for eliminating frivolous claims, such as the
Amnesty Int’l USA standard, U.S. courts should be able to handle the
claims. Also, many other countries—particularly those in Europe—
already have widespread information privacy rights, and have been
able to enforce those rights without adverse consequences to their
legal systems. 178 The Amnesty Int’l USA standard would create a way
to strengthen individual privacy rights without causing an
unreasonable rise in new data breach claims.
Recognizing a right to protection against unauthorized access to
personal data, and combining that right with the standard in Amnesty
Int’l USA, would allow courts to more closely follow the “cases and
controversies” language established by the U.S. Constitution. 179 This
method of determining standing would allow courts to address what
has happened, rather than requiring them to predict what may happen.
Courts should not be asked to predict the future, but should be able
to focus on the allegations already before them. And, as evidenced by
the different results in Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU, the injury-infact standard established by the Supreme Court can differentiate
between plaintiffs that meet the injury-in-fact requirement and
plaintiffs that do not. The Amnesty Int’l USA standard is flexible and
strong enough to find the proper balance in determining which suits
can be brought.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legal landscape is contradictory when it comes to
protecting a consumer’s right to data security. The current law allows
plaintiffs to bring claims if they have lost data to the government. But

177. See Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy
Gap Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 535, 536–537 (2001); The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9 (1996); The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (1970).
178. See Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . and Then There Was One: The Outlook for a SelfRegulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 357, 368–69 (2005).
179. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1385–87.
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if they lose data to a private party—even if that data is more sensitive—
they often are not allowed to bring their case in court.
This discrepancy is an unintended consequence of the standing
doctrine being applied to the digital world. The unwillingness to
recognize a right to privacy in personal data creates a substantial
hurdle for consumers in private data breach cases to overcome. In
response to these doctrines, consumers have turned to creative
theories of injury to qualify under the injury-in-fact requirement.
These theories, which often require courts to predict the future, are
difficult for courts to apply with any degree of consistency.
These problems of applying the standing doctrine to private data
breach cases have been discussed by multiple scholars, who have
recommended myriad methods of resolving the issue. However, many
of these suggestions would be difficult for courts to adopt and apply,
and some would still require courts to predict the future. Instead of
adopting a complicated solution, the problem can be resolved simply
by recognizing a legal right to reasonable protection of data given to
third parties in private transactions. If courts recognize this right, they
can apply a body of precedent that already deals with unauthorized
data collection—the standard established and applied in Amnesty Int’l
USA and ACLU.
By adopting this simple solution, consumers would get a fair
chance to bring actions in court if they have their data stolen in a data
breach. However, the standard established in Amnesty Int’l USA and
ACLU would also be stringent enough to block frivolous claims when
consumers cannot show that their data has been stolen. This standard
would allow courts to address private data breach claims fairly, without
a need to predict the probability of a potential future harm.
Nick Beatty ∗

∗

JD Candidate, Brigham Young University Law School, 2017.

1317

5.BEATTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1318

11/19/2016 1:35 PM

2016

